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Abstract
This paper considers optimal attack attention allocation on remote state estimation in multi-systems. Suppose there are M
independent systems, each of which has a remote sensor monitoring the system and sending its local estimates to a fusion
center over a packet-dropping channel. An attacker may generate noises to exacerbate the communication channels between
sensors and the fusion center. Due to capacity limitation, at each time the attacker can exacerbate at most N of the M channels.
The goal of the attacker side is to seek an optimal policy maximizing the estimation error at the fusion center. The problem
is formulated as a Markov decision process (MDP) problem, and the existence of an optimal deterministic and stationary
policy is proved. We further show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure, by which the computational complexity is
reduced significantly. Based on the threshold structure, a myopic policy is proposed for homogeneous models and its optimality
is established. To overcome the curse of dimensionality of MDP algorithms for general heterogeneous models, we further
provide an asymptotically (as M and N go to infinity) optimal solution, which is easy to compute and implement. Numerical
examples are given to illustrate the main results.
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1 Introduction
Motivations and backgrounds. Cyber-physical systems,
integrating information technology infrastructures with
physical processes, are ubiquitous and usually critical
in modern societies. Examples include sensor networks,
power grids, water and gas supply systems, transporta-
tion systems, water pollution monitoring systems. The
use of open communication networks, though enabling
more efficient design and flexible implementation, makes
cyber-physical systems more vulnerable to attacks Teix-
eira et al. [2015], Pasqualetti et al. [2015]. Illustrative
examples are Iran’s nuclear centrifuges accident Far-
well and Rohozinski [2011] and western Ukraine black-
out BBC [2016].
Many research works on attackers’ possible behaviors for
cyber-physical systems have been done recently. Gener-
Email addresses: xren@connect.ust.hk (Xiaoqiang
Ren), junfengw@kth.se (Junfeng Wu),
subhrakanti.dey@signal.uu.se (Subhrakanti Dey),
eesling@ust.hk (Ling Shi).
ally speaking, attacks can be classified as either denial
of service (DoS) attacks or deception attacks Amin et al.
[2009]. DoS attacks, comprising availability of data, are
most likely threats Byres and Lowe [2004] due to their
easy implementation. DoS attacks in networked control
systems are studied in Amin et al. [2009]. Optimal off-
line DoS attack on remote state estimation over a fi-
nite horizon for a single sensor system is investigated
in Zhang et al. [2015]. An interactive decision of send-
ing data by sensor and jamming channel by an attacker
for remote state estimation in a zero-sum game setting
is studied in Li et al. [2015], and a similar setting is in-
vestigated for a control system in Gupta et al. [2010].
Optimal DoS attacks were also studied in the context of
detection Ren et al. [2014a]. Deception attacks, compris-
ing integrity of data, are more subtle. Various types of
deception attacks have been studied, for example, replay
attacks Mo and Sinopoli [2009], stealthy deception at-
tacks Guo et al. [2016] and covert attacks Teixeira et al.
[2012].
Related works and contributions. In this paper, we con-
sider the DoS attacks. Each sensor monitors a (different)
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system and sends its estimates to a fusion center over a
packet-dropping channel. An attacker is present and is
capable of attack a certain number of channels at each
time. When a channel is under attack, the packet arrival
rate decreases. The problem is to study the optimal at-
tack policy to maximize the averaged estimation error at
the fusion center. A threshold structure of optimal poli-
cies is proved. The related works are Mo et al. [2012],
Ren et al. [2014b], Leong et al. [2015], which study the
structure of sensor scheduling policy. Our work differs
from these works as follows. First, our work focuses on
multi-systems, while a single sensor scenario is studied
in aforementioned three papers. Second, we use a fun-
damentally different methodology. Specifically, both Mo
et al. [2012] and Ren et al. [2014b] proved the struc-
ture results by analyzing the stationary probability dis-
tribution of states, which, however, works only in very
special and simple cases (e.g., a single sensor case). On
the contrary, we resort to the MDP theory, a more gen-
eral and powerful tool. Although an MDP approach was
also adopted in Leong et al. [2015], the methods used
to prove either the existence of optimal stationary and
deterministic policy or the threshold structure are sig-
nificantly different due to the different problem mod-
els (multi-systems versus single sensor system, different
cost/reward structures 1 ). Lastly, we provide an asymp-
totically optimal policy, which is rather easy to compute
and implement.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows.
(1) The problem of attack on remote state estimation
in multi-systems is studied by an MDP formula-
tion. The existence of a deterministic and station-
ary optimal policy is proved, which means that
standard MDP algorithms (e.g., value iteration al-
gorithm) can be utilized to compute the optimal
policy. Moreover, a threshold structure of optimal
policy is proved, by exploiting which a specialized
algorithm may be developed to reduce the com-
putational complexity. By the threshold structure,
a myopic policy is proposed and its optimality is
established for homogeneous models. The myopic
policy is such that the expected reward at the next
time is maximized.
(2) To overcome the curse of dimensionality of MDP al-
gorithms for general heterogeneous models, we pro-
vide an asymptotically optimal index-based policy
using the multi-armed bandit theory. Since the in-
dices are computed based on each system solely,
they are quite easy to compute. The index-based
policy is implemented just by comparing these in-
dices. What is more, our numerical examples show
that this asymptotically optimal policy works quite
well even when the number of total systems is small.
1 See the details in Footnote 8.
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Fig. 1. Remote state estimation with an attacker.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the mathematical formulation of the consid-
ered problem is given. The main results, including the
MDP formulation, existence of a stationary and deter-
ministic optimal policy, threshold structure of the opti-
mal policy and the asymptotically optimal index-based
policy, are provided in Section 3. Numerical examples
are given in Section 4 to illustrate the main results, after
which we conclude the paper in Section 5. All the proofs
are presented in Appendices.
Notation: R (R+) is the set of real (nonnegative) num-
bers and N the set of nonnegative integer numbers. Sn+
(Sn++) is the set of n by n real positive semi-definite
(definite) matrices. For a matrix X, we use Tr(X), X>
and |X| to denote its trace, transpose and spectral ra-
dius, respectively. We write X  0 (X  0) if X ∈ Sn+
(X ∈ Sn++). For a vector x, denote its i-th element
as x[i]. We use ◦ to denote function composition, i.e.,
for two functions f and g, (f ◦ g)(x) = f(g(x)), and
gi(x) , g ◦ g ◦ · · · ◦ g︸ ︷︷ ︸
i times
(x) with g0(x) , x. Let × de-
note Cartesian product. For a set A, define the indi-
cator function as 1A(x) = 1, if x ∈ A; 0 otherwise.
Let Pr(·)(Pr(·|·)) be the (conditional) probability. For
x ∈ R, denote by bxc the largest integer less than or
equal to x. Let E[·] be the expectation of a random vari-
able.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Remote Estimation with Packet-dropping Chan-
nels
There are totally M independent discrete-time (i.e., sam-
pled) linear time-invariant systems and M sensors. The
i-th sensor monitors the i-th system (Fig. 1):
x
(i)
k+1 = Aix
(i)
k + ω
(i)
k , (1a)
y
(i)
k = Cix
(i)
k + υ
(i)
k , (1b)
2
where x
(i)
k ∈ Rni is the system state vector and y(i)k ∈
Rmi is the observation vector. The noisesω(i)k and υ
(i)
k are
i.i.d. white Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and covariance Qi  0, Ri  0, respectively. The ini-
tial state x
(i)
0 is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
that is uncorrelated with ω
(i)
k and υ
(i)
k . It is assumed
that the systems at different sensors are independent of
each other. To avoid trivial problems, we assume the
systems are unstable, i.e., |Ai| > 1,∀i = 1, . . . , M. The
pair (Ci, Ai) is assumed to be detectable and (Ai, Q
1/2
i )
stabilizable.
Each sensor is assumed to be intelligent in the sense
that a Kalman filter is run locally. With the above de-
tectability and stabilizability assumptions, the estima-
tion error covariance associated with each local Kalman
filter converges exponentially to a steady state Anderson
and Moore [2012]. On the other hand, since the nature
of asymptotic behaviors of remote estimation under ma-
licious attacks (which will be elaborated later) over an
infinite horizon cost is investigated, without any perfor-
mance loss, we assume the Kalman filter at each sensor
enters into the steady state at k = 0. Let the steady
state estimation error covariance at sensor i be Pˆ (i).
At each time k, sensor i sends the output of its lo-
cal Kalman filter (i.e., the a posterior minimum mean
square error (MMSE) estimate) xˆ
(i)
k Anderson and
Moore [2012] to a fusion center over a packet-dropping
communication channel. Let γ
(i)
k ∈ {0, 1} denote
whether or not the packet is received error-free by the
fusion center. If it arrives successfully, γ
(i)
k = 1; γ
(i)
k = 0
otherwise. Again since the asymptotic behavior over an
infinite horizon is studied, it is assumed without any
performance loss that γ
(i)
0 = 1,∀i = 1, . . . , M. Since the
sensor sends the local MMSE estimates instead of raw
measurements, the MMSE estimate and the associated
error covariance at the fusion center (whether or not
the attacker introduced later is present) for k ≥ 1 is:
x˜
(i)
k =
{
xˆ
(i)
k , if γ
(i)
k = 1,
Aix˜
(i)
k−1, if γ
(i)
k = 0,
P˜
(i)
k =
{
Pˆ (i), if γ
(i)
k = 1,
hi(P˜
(i)
k−1), if γ
(i)
k = 0,
where functions hi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M, are defined as follows:
hi(X) = AiXA
>
i +Qi, forX ∈ Sni+ .
Notice that by the assumption γ
(i)
0 = 1,∀i, the starting
point at the fusion center is: x˜
(i)
0 = xˆ
(i)
0 and P˜
(i)
0 = Pˆ
(i).
2.2 Attack Model
There is an attacker capable of generating noises to ex-
acerbate the communication channels between sensors
and the fusion center. Due to capacity limitation, at each
time the attacker can only choose at most N of the M
channels to attack. Let η
(i)
k ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether
or not the i-th channel is under attack: η
(i)
k = 1 if it is;
η
(i)
k = 0 otherwise. We make the following assumption
about the effects of the attacks on packet dropouts.
Assumption 1 The packet loss process is memoryless
with respect to the considered attacks, i.e., the following
equality holds for any k ≥ 1:
Pr(γ
(i)
1 , . . . , γ
(i)
k |η(i)1:k) =
k∏
j=1
Pr(γ
(i)
j |η(i)j ),
where η
(i)
1:k , (η
(i)
1 , . . . , η
(i)
k ). Let Pr(γ
(i)
k = 1|η(i)k =
0) = i and Pr(γ
(i)
k = 1|η(i)k = 1) = i. We assume that
0 < i < i ≤ 1.
It is assumed that the attacker has the knowledge of
system dynamics (i.e., Ai, Ci, Qi and Ri
2 ), has access
to the knowledge of {γ(i)k }k∈N,∀i = 1, . . . , M, and is able
to learn the channels’ packet arrival rate with or with-
out attacks (i.e., i and i) from realization of {γ(i)k }k∈N.
At each time, the attacker determines the subset of the
communication channels to be attacked based on all the
information it collects. Let γk = (γ
(1)
k , . . . , γ
(M)
k ) and
γ1:k = (γ1, . . . , γk); ηk and η1:k are defined in the same
way. Define a feasible attack attention allocation deci-
sion rule at time k as a stochastic kernel pik from γ1:k−1
and η1:k−1 to Ω 3 , where Ω is the set of all feasible ηk:
Ω ,
{
η ∈ {0, 1}M :
M∑
i=1
η[i] ≤ N
}
.
2 The steady state estimation error covariance Pˆ (i) thus
can be obtained by solving a discrete-time algebraic Riccati
equation.
3 We say pik is a stochastic kernel from γ1:k−1 and η1:k−1
to Ω if the map pik : ℘(Ω)×{0, 1}M(k−1)×Ωk−1 7→ [0, 1] with
℘(Ω) being the power set of Ω has the following properties:
(1) For any realization of γ1:k−1 ∈ {0, 1}M(k−1) and
η1:k−1 ∈ Ωk−1, pik(·|γ1:k−1, η1:k−1) is a probability
measure on ℘(Ω).
(2) For any set B ∈ ℘(Ω), pik(B|·) is a measurable function
on {0, 1}M(k−1) × Ωk−1.
This kernel-form definition includes the possibility that the
attack policy is randomized. Nevertheless, in Section 3 we
prove that there exists a deterministic optimal attack policy.
3
Let pi = (pi1, . . . , pik, . . .) be the infinite-horizon attack
policy. A policy pi is feasible only if pik, k ≥ 1 are feasible.
Let Π be the set of all feasible policies. The reward (from
the perspective of the attacker) associated with an attack
policy pi is the averaged infinite-horizon estimation error
at the centers defined as
R(pi) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T∑
k=1
M∑
i=1
Tr(P˜
(i)
k )
]
. (2)
The goal of the attacker is to seek a feasible policy max-
imizing the above reward:
Problem 1
sup
pi∈Π
R(pi). (3)
To avoid trivial problems, we assume i > 1 − 1|Ai|2 ,∀i.
Otherwise, the attacker may consistently attack the
communication channel of the i-th system to gain an in-
finite reward since P˜
(i)
k →∞ as k →∞ in the presence
of consistent attacks.
3 Main Results
In this section, we solve Problem 1 by formulating it
as a MDP problem. We show that, without any perfor-
mance loss, the attack decision rule can be restricted
to a smaller class: the optimal policy is deterministic
(i.e., the stochastic kernel pik is reduced to a measur-
able function), stationary (independent of time index k)
and Markovian (the argument is not the whole history
γ1:k−1). We further prove that the optimal policy has
a threshold structure. For the asymptotic regime (i.e.,
M → ∞ and N → ∞), an explicit form of the optimal
policy is provided, which is quite easy to compute and
implement.
3.1 MDP Formulation
Before proceeding, we define a random variable τ
(i)
k as
τ
(i)
k = k −max{k∗ : γ(i)k∗ = 1, 0 ≤ k∗ ≤ k},
which indicates the time duration from the last success-
ful transmission time to time k. Let τk = (τ
(1)
k , . . . , τ
(M)
k ).
For ease of exposition, except for the myopic policy and
asymptotic analysis, in the remainder of this section we
assume that M = 2 and N = 1. We remark that the fol-
lowing MDP formulation and the existence of a deter-
ministic and stationary optimal policy (Theorem 1) can
be extended trivially to the cases with general M and N.
While for the threshold structure, see Remark 1.
Now we describe the formulated infinite-horizon
discrete-time MDP by a quadruplet (S, A, P (·|·, ·),
r(·, ·)). Each item in the tuple is elaborated as follows.
(1) The state at time step k ≥ 1 is defined as sk ,
(τ
(1)
k−1, τ
(2)
k−1). Therefore, the state space S = N2.
(2) The action space A , {0, e1, e2}, where 0 = (0, 0)
means that none of the systems is attacked, e1 =
(1, 0) and e2 = (0, 1) means that only the first and
only the second is attacked, respectively.
(3) The transition probability is stationary. Let s =
(j1, j2), s
′ = (j′1, j
′
2) with ji, j
′
i ∈ N, i = 1, 2 and
a ∈ A, then ∀k ≥ 1,
P (s′|s, a) , Pr(sk+1 = s′|sk = s, ak = a)
, p1(j′1|j1, a[1])p2(j′2|j2, a[2]),
where for i = 1, 2,
pi(j
′
i|ji, a[i]) =

i, if j
′
i = 0, a[i] = 0,
i, if j
′
i = 0, a[i] = 1,
1− i, if j′i = ji + 1, a[i] = 0,
1− i, if j′i = ji + 1, a[i] = 1,
0, otherwise.
(4) The one-stage reward is independent of the action
and defined as
r(s = (j1, j2), a) = Tr(h
j1
1 (Pˆ
(1))) + Tr(hj22 (Pˆ
(2))).
(4)
Let Hk , (s1, a1, . . . , sk) be the history of states and
actions up to time k, and θ = (θ1, . . . , θk, . . .) be an
admissible policy with θk as a stochastic kernel from Hk
to A. Let Θ be the class of all such admissible policies.
Define the reward associated with initial state s1 = s
and policy θ by
J(s, θ) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
Eθs
[
T∑
k=1
r(sk, ak)
]
.
Let s1:k , (s1, . . . , sk). It is evident that s1:k−1 is equiv-
alent to γ1:k−1, and thus θ is also equivalent to pi (spe-
cialized to the case M = 2, N = 1). One thus verifies that
Problem 1 (specialized to the case M = 2, N = 1) can be
equivalently transformed to the following problem.
Problem 2 Find the optimal policy θ∗ ∈ Θ such that
J((0, 0), θ∗) = sup
θ∈Θ
J((0, 0), θ).
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3.2 Structural Results
We first show that the optimal policy is stationary and
deterministic, and satisfies an equality. We say that θ =
(θ1, . . . , θk, . . .) is stationary and deterministic, if there
exists a measurable function f : S 7→ A satisfying ∀k ≥
1, θk(f(s)|H′k) = 1 for any H′k , (s1, a1, . . . , sk = s).
Therefore, in the following, with abuse of notations, we
use f to represent a stationary and deterministic policy
and let F be the set of all admissible stationary and
deterministic policies. For a measurable function q : S 7→
R, denote
G(q, s, a) ,
∑
s′∈S
q(s′)P (s′|s, a). (5)
We then have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 There exists an optimal stationary and
deterministic policy f∗ ∈ F such that
J(s, f∗) ≥ J(s, θ), ∀s ∈ S, θ ∈ Θ.
Moreover,
f∗(s) = arg max
a∈A
{r(s, a))− %∗ +G(q, s, a)}, (6)
J(s, f∗) =%∗,
where q : S 7→ R and %∗ ∈ R satisfy
q(s) = max
a∈A
{r(s, f(s))− %∗ +G(q, s, a)}. (7)
Theorem 1 says that deterministic and stationary op-
timal policy exists and can be computed as (6) with a
differential value function (i.e., q(s)) satisfying the Bell-
man equation (7). This provides a theoretic basis for fur-
ther analysis (structural properties of optimal policies)
and computation methods. In particular, with some ad-
ditional technical requirements 4 , the value iteration
algorithm converges. Furthermore, following the ideas
in [Sennott, 2009, Chapter 8], one can use a value it-
eration algorithm for finite states to approximate the
countable state space in our case, and compute the op-
timal policy f∗, the differential value function q and the
optimal averaged reward %∗.
We now present a nice structure of the optimal policy
f∗, which helps reduce the computational complexity of
the MDP algorithm significantly.
4 One may verify that all requirements in [Zhu and Guo,
2005, Assumption 3.8] are satisfied in our case. Due to the
limited space, we omit the verification here.
Theorem 2 There exists a critical curve lc(j1, j2) = 0,
of which the function lc(j1, j2) is non-decreasing (and
non-increasing) with respect to j1 (j2), dividing N2 into
disjoint regions such that
(1) f∗(s = (j1, j2)) = e1, if lc(j1, j2) > 0;
(2) f∗(s = (j1, j2)) = e2, if lc(j1, j2) ≤ 0.
Due to their ease in implementation and enabling effi-
cient computation, structural results of the optimal de-
terministic and stationary policy are very much appeal-
ing to decision makers Puterman [2005]. Thanks to the
threshold structure, one only needs to store the transi-
tion points a priori, and the online implementation is
simply by comparisons. Specialized algorithms can be
developed to search among a special class (much smaller)
of policies instead of general backward induction algo-
rithms (less efficient) Puterman [2005].
Remark 1 The threshold structure can be extended to
cases with general M and N. For 1 ≤ i ≤ M, define
j−i , (j1, . . . , ji−1, ji+1, . . . , jM) as the state of the whole
system except for the i-th system. Then the optimal
policy has the following threshold structure. Let state
s = (j1, . . . , jM), there exist measurable functions li :
NM−1 7→ N such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ M, the optimal
policy f∗ has the form:
(1) if ji ≥ li(j−i ), f∗(s) ∈ Ei;
(2) if ji < li(j
−
i ), f
∗(s) ∈ Ω\Ei,
where Ei represents the feasible attack attention alloca-
tion subset such that the i-th system is under attack:
Ei ,
{
η ∈ {0, 1}M :
M∑
i=1
η[i] ≤ N, η[i] = 1
}
.
What is more, the functions li, 1 ≤ i ≤ M are such that
at each time there are exactly N systems to be attacked.
We now consider homogeneous models where the system
dynamics are the same and i, i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M are identi-
cal. For the homogeneous models with general M and N,
we propose a myopic policy as follows. At each time k,
the attacker attacks the N systems with largest τ
(i)
k−1. De-
note this myopic policy by pim. Then based on the above
threshold structure and the symmetry of homogeneous
models, one easily obtains the following corollary, the
proof of which is omitted.
Corollary 1 The myopic policy pim is optimal to
Problem 1 for homogeneous models, i.e., R(pim) =
suppi∈Π R(pi).
Note that to implement the myopic policy pim, no specific
model knowledge is required. Instead, one only needs to
know the realization of the packet arrival process.
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3.3 Explicit Asymptotic Optimal Policy
When M is large, the “curse of dimensionality” will ren-
der MDP numerical algorithms impractical. Then for
heterogeneous models, one may ask whether or not there
exists an algorithm that resembles the above myopic pol-
icy. The answer is positive. In the following, we provide
an algorithm that is quite easy to compute and imple-
ment. Furthermore, it is proved to be asymptotically op-
timal as M and N go to infinity.
3.3.1 Virtual Attack Model
To present the algorithm, we introduce an virtual at-
tacker. Consider the i-th system in isolation. Assume
that an (virtual) attacker is able to attack the i-th sys-
tem all the time, while if the attacker refuses to launch
an attack at some time, it receives an extra constant
“subsidy” zi (which is independent of the system state
τ
(i)
k−1). In other words, the one-stage reward is given by
ri(τ
(i)
k−1, η
(i)
k ) = Tr(h
τ
(i)
k−1
i (Pˆ
(i))) + (1− η(i)k )zi.
The goal of the attacker is to maximize the averaged
infinite-horizon accumulated reward as in Problem 1 for
the sole i-th system: lim infT→∞ 1TE
[∑T
k=1 ri(τ
(i)
k−1, η
(i)
k )
]
.
Denote the optimal rule for the state τ
(i)
k−1 = j with
j ∈ N when the subsidy is zi as d∗i (j, zi) 5 : d∗i (j, zi) = 0
if no attacks and d∗i (j, zi) = 1 otherwise.
To maximize the average infinite-horizon reward for the
sole i-th system, one can also formulate it as an MDP
problem and prove the existence of optimal deterministic
and stationary policy. Furthermore, as for Theorem 2,
one can prove the monotonicity of the differential value
function as well, based on which the threshold structure
of d∗i (j, zi) can be proved. Specifically, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ M,
given zi, d
∗
i (j, zi) has a form as
d∗i (j, zi) =
{
1, if j ≥ `i(zi),
0, if j < `i(zi),
(8)
where `i(zi) is a function of zi.
5 We use this notation to emphasize the dependence on zi.
It quite easy to show that the optimal rule is stationary, we
thus omit the time index k.
3.3.2 Index-based Policy
We introduce an index oi(·) : N 7→ R associated with
τ
(i)
k−1 = j, which satisfies that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ M,
vi(j)
[
1− (1− i)j
i
oi(j) +
j∑
n=0
Tr(hni (Pˆ
(i)))(1− i)n
+ (1− i)j
∞∑
n=1
Tr(hn+ji (Pˆ
(i)))(1− i)n
]
=vi(j + 1)
[
1− (1− i)j+1
i
oi(j) +
j∑
n=0
Tr(hni (Pˆ
(i)))(1− i)n
+ (1− i)j+1
∞∑
n=0
Tr(hn+j+1i (Pˆ
(i)))(1− i)n
]
,
(9)
where vi(j) is computed by
vi(j) =
1
i−1 − (1− i)ji−1 + (1− i)ji−1 .
Notice that oi(·) only depends on the i-th system and is
irrelative with the others. Notice also that oi(j) in (9)
can be interpreted as the subsidy such that when the i-
th system state τ
(i)
k−1 = j, the action “attack” and “not
attack” are equally attractive if the single i-th system is
considered. We propose an index-based policy, denoted
by pid, as follows. At each time k, the attacker attacks
the N systems of greatest index oi(τ
(i)
k−1). We then have
the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The index-based policy pid is asymptoti-
cally optimal to Problem 1. That is, as M→∞ and N→
∞ with N < M, R(pid)→ R∗, where R∗ = suppi∈Π R(pi).
Remark 2 Numerical simulations in Section 4 show
that the index-based policy pid works quite well even
when M and N are small.
Remark 3 In some scenarios, the attacker might get a
larger reward for attacking one system than the other.
Then one may add different weight to attacks on differ-
ent channels, i.e., the reward in (2) is replaced with
R(pi) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[
T∑
k=1
M∑
i=1
wiTr(P˜
(i)
k )
]
,
with wi ∈ R+ being weight coefficients. The main re-
sults in this paper, Theorems 1–3, still hold. Amending
the reward function by adding into the coefficients, the
analysis in the appendices remains valid.
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4 Numerical Examples
In this section, we use numerical examples to illustrate
the threshold structure of the optimal policy (Theo-
rem 2), the optimality of the myopic policy for homo-
geneous models (Corollary 1) and the asymptotic opti-
mality of the index-based policy (Theorem 3).
Example 1 We let M = 2 and N = 1. The parameters
involved are as follows:
A1 =
[
1.2 0.2
0.3 1
]
, A2 =
[
1.2 0.15
0 1.1
]
,
Q1 =
[
2 0
0 1
]
, Q2 =
[
1 0.5
0.5 0.5
]
,
C1 = [1, 0], C2 = [1, 0.2], R1 = 1, R2 = 3, 1 = 0.95, 1 =
0.5, 2 = 0.9 and 2 = 0.4. Notice that the steady-state
local estimation error covariances are
Pˆ (1) =
[
0.79 0.54
0.54 8
]
, Pˆ (2) =
[
1.54 −0.49
−0.49 11.87
]
.
We compute the optimal policy and optimal averaged
reward using the value iteration algorithm. To cope
with the countable infinity of the state space, the ideas
in [Sennott, 2009, Chapter 8] are borrowed. The de-
tails of the algorithm are as follows. We truncate the
state space with N ∈ N, i.e., the truncated state space
SN , {0, . . . , N}2. Compute the value function (defined
on SN ) iteratively by
JNn (s) = max
a∈A
{r(s, a) +G(JNn−1, s, a)}, ∀s ∈ SN
with JN0 (s) = 0. Since the value iteration algorithm con-
verges in our case (see Zhu and Guo [2005]), then for
any N , let
%∗N , lim
n→∞J
N
n ((0, 0))− JNn−1((0, 0)),
qN (s) , lim
n→∞J
N
n (s)− JNn ((0, 0)).
One thus obtain the differential value function q(s) =
limN→∞ qN (s),∀s ∈ S. The N is chosen such that |%∗N−
%∗N−1|/%∗N−1 is smaller than a prescribed tolerance er-
ror. In our simulation, we let N = 19 and the error
is 0.01. We obtain that the optimal averaged reward is
50.21 and the optimal policy is depicted as in Fig. 2.
One may see that the optimal policy has the threshold
structure stated in Theorem 2.
Example 2 We shall show that the myopic policy is
optimal for homogeneous models. To this end, each sys-
tem is the same as the 2nd system in Example 1, and the
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Fig. 2. Optimal action of state s = (j1, j2) with x-axis pre-
senting j1 and y-axis j2. The red stars and blue circles indi-
cate the action e1 and e2, respectively.
state space is also truncated with N = 19. In the first
case, we let M = 2, N = 1; the second case M = 3, N = 2
and the third case M = 5, N = 2. The averaged reward
obtained by the MDP algorithm and the myopic policy
are shown in Table 1. As a baseline, we also simulate
a random policy: at each time, N out of the M systems
are randomly and uniformly chosen to be attacked. One
sees that the averaged rewards obtained by the optimal
MDP algorithm and the myopic policy are quite close,
which verifies the optimality of the myopic policy. Also,
compared with the random policy, the myopic policy has
a significant performance improvement.
Table 1
Averaged reward obtained by the MDP algorithm (denote
by the symbol ♠), the myopic policy (♣) and random policy
(♥) in different cases for homogeneous models.
Case No. ♠ ♣ ♥
1 40.98 40.82 29.94
2 71.49 71.37 55.91
3 93.75 93.46 71.45
Example 3 We do simulations for four cases with het-
erogeneous models: in the first case, we let M = 2, N = 1;
the second case M = 3, N = 2, the third case M = 5, N =
2 and the fourth case M = 6, N = 3 6 . In each case
the first bM/2c systems are the same as the 1-st sys-
tem in Example 1, while the remaining are the same
as the 2nd system. We truncate the state space with
N = 12, which is mainly due to computation accuracy of
index oi(·) defined in (9). Specifically, since as j →∞,
vi(j)[1 − (1 − i)j ]/i → v′i(j)[1 − (1 − i)j+1]/i, then
when j is large enough (N = 13 for 1-st system and
6 We do not simulate asymptotic cases (i.e., M and N are suf-
ficiently large) since state space size increases exponentially
with respect to M, the memory required would be beyond
our capabilities.
7
N = 17 for 2-th system), numerical computing soft-
ware (Matlab in our simulation) cannot provide accu-
rate value of oi(·). The averaged reward obtained by the
MDP algorithm, the index-based policy and the random
policy (the same as in the second example) are shown in
Table 2, from which one sees that the index-based policy
approximates the MDP algorithm surprisingly well even
in these non-asymptotic cases. As in Example 2, the
index-based policy has a significant performance gain
over the random policy. To better illustrate this perfor-
mance gain, we further simulate the index-based policy
and the random policy for some large M’s and N’s (we do
not simulate the MDP algorithm due to capacity limi-
tation). The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 2
Averaged reward obtained by the MDP algorithm (denote
by the symbol ♠), the index-based policy (♦) and random
policy (♥) in different cases for heterogeneous models.
Case No. ♠ ♦ ♥
1 44.88 42.72 28.15
2 80.50 78.97 51.97
3 106.37 103.4 69.03
4 136.22 131.94 84.5
Table 3
Averaged reward obtained by the index-based policy (denote
by the symbol ♦) and random policy (♥) in different cases
(with large M’s and N’s) for heterogeneous models.
Case No. ♦ ♥
1 4 446 2 816
2 18 971 12 658
3 22 269 14 082
4 25 733 16 885
5 Conclusion
In this paper, attack allocation on remote state estima-
tion in multi-systems was considered. The problem was
solved by formulating it as an MDP problem, of which
an optimal deterministic and stationary policy exists.
Threshold structure of the optimal policy was proved, by
which both online implementation and off-line computa-
tion overhead can be reduced. To overcome the curse of
dimensionality, an asymptotically optimal index-based
policy, which is quite easy to compute and implement,
was provided. The results were verified by numerical
simulations. In particular, our numerical examples illus-
trated that the index-based policy works well even when
the number of systems is small. An interesting direc-
tion of future works is to investigate the problem in a
game-theoretic way, where the sensors (which have lim-
ited communication energy) are aware of the presence of
the attacker.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that our MDP model has some “nice”
properties, by which Theorem 1 can be proved. To this
end, we define a function W : S 7→ [1,∞) as
W (s = (j1, j2))
=
{
2, if j1 = 0, j2 = 0,
W1(j1) +W2(j2), otherwise,
(10)
with W1,W2 : N 7→ [1,∞) as
W1(j) =
{
φλj1, if j ≤ N1,
φλN11 |A1|2(j−N1), if j > N1,
W2(j) =
{
φλj2, if j ≤ N2,
φλN22 |A2|2(j−N2), if j > N2,
where φ, λi, Ni are parameters satisfying the following:
for each i = 1, 2,
λi >1,
(1− i)(λi − 1) ≤1
2
12, (11)
φ[β − (1− 1
2
12)] ≥1, (12)
φλNii [β − (1− i)|Ai|2] ≥φ+ 1, (13)
with a constant β < 1, which is bounded below by
β > max
(
1− 1
2
12, (1− i)|Ai|2
)
, i = 1, 2. (14)
One may see that since φ > 1, λi > 1, Wi together with
W are well defined (i.e., they are all greater than 1).
About W , we have the following two lemmas. Before
proceeding, we need the following definition.
Definition 1 Given a function W : S 7→ [1,∞), for a
function u : S 7→ R, define its W−norm as
‖u‖W = sup
s∈S
|u(s)|/W (s).
Let BW (S) be the normed linear space of measurable
functions u on S with ‖u‖W <∞.
Lemma 1 For any f ∈ F, the transition kernel
P (·|·, f(·)) is uniformly W−geometrically ergodic 7 ,
7 Interested readers are referred to Meyn and Tweedie
[1993] to see a more elegant definition, which, however, re-
quires more background knowledge, and is thus omitted
here.
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i.e., for any f ∈ F and any measurable function
u ∈ BW (S), there exists a probability measure µf (de-
pending on f) and constants L and δ < 1, which are
independent of f , such that for any s ∈ S, k ∈ N,∣∣∣∣G(u, s, f(s))− ∫ udµf ∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖u‖WW (s)Lδk. (15)
Proof 1 We prove that for each f ∈ F, there exist con-
stant 0 < $ < 1 and b, which are independent of f ,
such that
P ((0, 0)|(0, 0), f((0, 0))) ≥ $ (16)
and for any s ∈ S
G(W , s, f(s)) ≤ βW (s) + b1{(0,0)}(s) (17)
where W (·) and β are defined in (10) and (14), respec-
tively. Then by [Meyn and Tweedie, 1994, Theorem 2.1
and 2.2], for each f , L and δ in (15) can be chosen
in terms of $,β, b (which are independent of f). The
uniform ergodicity in Lemma 1 thus can be established.
Equation (16) is trivial. To show (17), notice that when
s = (0, 0), one may choose a sufficiently large b such
that (17) is satisfied. Let s , (j1, j2) 6= (0, 0), suppose
the action is e1, then
G(W , s, f(s))
=(1− 1)W1(j1 + 1) + (1− 2)W2(j2 + 1)
+ 1(1− 2)φ+ (1− 1)2φ+ 212
≤(1− 1)W1(j1 + 1) + 1(1− 2)φ+ 1 (18)
+ (1− 2)W2(j2 + 1) + (1− 1)2φ+ 1 (19)
Denote the term in (18) and (19) by Λ1 and Λ2, respec-
tively. We show Λ1 ≤ βW1(j1) by examining cases.
Case j1 < N1:
Λ1 =(1− 1)λ1W1(j1) + 1(1− 2)φ+ 1
≤(1− 1)λ1W1(j1) + 1(1− 2)W1(j1) + 1
≤(1− 1
2
12)W1(j1) + 1
≤βW1(j1),
where the second inequality follows from (11) and the
last one (12).
Case j1 ≥ N1:
Λ1 =(1− 1)|A1|2W1(j1) + 1(1− 2)φ+ 1
≤βW1(j1),
where the inequality follows from (13). Using similar
arguments, one may prove Λ2 ≤ βW2(j2), which com-
pletes the case when action e1 is used. When e2 or 0,
similar results can be proved in the same way. The proof
thus is complete. 
Lemma 2 There exists a constant α such that∥∥r¯(s)∥∥
W
≤ α,
with r¯(s) , supa∈A r(s, a).
Proof 2 Let W ′i (j) = |Ai|2j , j ∈ N, i = 1, 2. Since
W (s) ≥ 1,∀s, we only need to check asymptotic case of
r¯(s)/W (s). Since for i = 1, 2,
lim
j→∞
Wi(j)
W ′i (j)
= φλNii |Ai|−2Ni
is a constant, it suffices to prove for i = 1, 2,
lim sup
j→∞
Tr(hji (Pˆ
(i)))
W ′i (j)
<∞. (20)
Since the arguments are exactly the same, we do not
distinguish i = 1 and i = 2 and suppress subscript i in
the remainder of this proof. Let ϕ be a constant such
that Pˆ  ϕI and Q  ϕI. Define a function
g(X) = AXA> + ϕI.
One then obtains that
hj(Pˆ ) gj(ϕI)  ϕ
j∑
k=0
Ak(A>)k,
which yields that Tr(hj(Pˆ ))/|A|2j is bounded. Equa-
tion (20) thus follows and the proof is complete. 
We are ready to prove Theorem 1 using the results in Guo
and Zhu [2006] 8 . Since our state space is denumer-
able, by Remark 4.1(b) thereof, to prove Theorem 1, it
suffices to verify Assumptions 3.1,3.2 9 and 3.3 thereof.
Since our action space is finite, Assumption 3.2 holds
trivially. Assumption 3.1 and 3.3 follows directly from
Lemma 1 and 2 (see Remark 3.3(b) thereof). The proof
thus is complete.
8 Notice that the distinguished feature of our MDP model
is that the one-stage reward function is unbounded above,
while the conventional MDP models (including the model
in Leong et al. [2015]) have the reward (cost) function being
bounded above (below).
9 Notice that in Guo and Zhu [2006], the goal is to mini-
mize an average cost, while we aims to maximize a reward
function. Assumption 3.2 thereof should be adjusted accord-
ingly, i.e., the requirement that the one-stage cost function
is lower semicontinuous should be replaced with that the
one-stage reward function is upper semicontinuous.
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Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 2
To present structure of the optimal action, we give the
following supporting lemma about the structure of so-
called differential value function q(s) in (7). To this end,
we define a partial order on S. Let s = (j1, j2), s′ =
(j′1, j
′
2) ∈ S, we say that s 4 s′ if j1 ≤ j′1 and j2 ≤ j′2.
This partially ordered set is a lattice. Let s ↑ (↓)s′ denote
the join (meet) on (4,S).
Lemma 3 Let s, s′ ∈ S, for function q(·), the follow-
ings hold:
Monotonicity: If s 4 s′, q(s) ≤ q(s′).
Submodularity: q(s) + q(s′) ≥ q(s ↓ s′) + q(s ↑ s′).
Proof 3 Let 0 < α < 1. Define the discounted reward
associated with the initial state s1 = s and policy θ by
Jα(s, θ) = lim inf
T→∞
1
T
Eθs
[
T∑
k=1
αkr(sk, ak)
]
,
and J∗α(s) , supθ∈Θ Jα(s, θ). With the existence of sta-
tionary and deterministic optimal policy proved in The-
orem 1, one may let
q(s) = lim
α→1
Vα(s).
with Vα(s) = J
∗
α(s)− J∗α((0, 0)).
Then we show the monotonicity and submodularity of
q(s) by examining Va(s). We do this by value iteration.
To this end, we define a dynamic programming operator
Tα: given a measurable function u : S 7→ R, let
Tαu(s) , max
a∈A
[r(s, a) + αG(u, s, a)] , s ∈ S.
Given 0 < α < 1, we define a function W ′α : S 7→
[1,∞) (depending on α) that has exactly the same form
as W (s) in (10) but the parameters involved have a
different constraint. Specifically, the equations (11)-(13)
are replaced with
(1− i)(λi − 1) < 1
α
− 1,
1 ≤ φ < 1
α
,
φλNii [1− (1− i)|Ai|2] ≥φ+ 1.
Using the same arguments as for Lemma 2, it is easy to
see that
∥∥ supa∈A r(s, a)∥∥W ′α < ∞. Thus, for any 0 <
α < 1, ‖J∗α(s)‖W ′α < ∞. Furthermore, by some basic
calculations, one obtains that W ′α satisfies [Herna´ndez-
Lerma and Lasserre, 1999, Assumption 8.3.2]. It then
follows from Proposition 8.3.9 thereof, Tα is contraction
operator on BW ′α(S). By Banach’s Fixed Point Theo-
rem, for any u ∈ BW ′α(S), 0 < a < 1,
lim
n→∞T
n
α u = J
∗
α(s). (21)
Since given α, J∗α((0, 0)) is a constant, the structure
(montonicity or submodularity) of Vα(s) can be proved
by showing that J∗α(s) has the same structure. By (21),
it suffices to prove that the structure is preserved by the
dynamic operator Tα.
Monotonicity: Suppose s 4 s′ and u(s) ≤ u(s′), since
for any f , r(s, f(s)) ≤ r(s′, f(s′)), it holds that
r(s, f(s))+αG(u, s, f(s)) ≤ r(s′, f(s′))+αG(u, s′, f(s′))
for any f , which yields Tαu(s) ≤ Tαu(s′).
Submodularity: By the monotonicity of q(s), without
any performance loss one may eliminate action 0. In
the remainder, we let the action space A = {e1, e2}.
Suppose u ∈ BW ′α(S) is monotonic, and for any s, s′ ∈ S
u(s) + u(s′) ≥ u(s ↓ s′) + u(s ↑ s′), (22)
we need to prove Tαu(s) + Tαu(s
′) ≥ Tαu(s ↓ s′) +
Tαu(s ↑ s′). By the definition of one stage reward func-
tion r(s, a), it suffices to prove
max
a∈A
G(u, s, a) + max
a∈A
G(u, s′, a)
≥max
a∈A
G(u, s ↓ s′, a) + max
a∈A
G(u, s ↑ s′, a). (23)
Let s = (j1, j2), s
′ = (j′1, j
′
2) with j1 ≤ j′1, j2 ≥ j′2.
Without loss of any generality, we assume (1− 1)(1−
2) ≥ (1 − 1)(1 − 2). For the function u, define the
optimal action associated with state s by
a∗(s) , arg max
a∈A
G(u, s, a).
In the following, we prove (23) by cases.
Case a∗(s ↓ s′) = a∗(s ↑ s′): Without loss of generality,
we let a∗(s ↓ s′) = a∗(s ↑ s′) = e1. Let ε1 = (1− 1)(1−
10
2), one then obtains that
max
a∈A
G(u, s, a) + max
a∈A
G(u, s, a)
≥G(u, s, e1) +G(u, s′, e1)
=ε1
(
u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + u((j
′
1 + 1, j
′
2 + 1))
)
+ (1− 1)2
(
u((j1 + 1, 0)) + u((j
′
1 + 1, 0))
)
+ 1(1− 2)
(
u((0, j2 + 1)) + u((0, j
′
2 + 1))
)
+ 212u((0, 0))
,ε1
(
u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + u((j
′
1 + 1, j
′
2 + 1))
)
+ Λ
≥ε1
(
u((j1 + 1, j
′
2 + 1)) + u((j
′
1 + 1, j2 + 1))
)
+ Λ
=G(u, s ↓ s′, e1) +G(u, s ↑ s′, e1)
= max
a∈A
G(u, s ↓ s′, a) + max
a∈A
G(u, s ↑ s′, a),
where the second inequality follows from (22).
Case a∗(s ↓ s′) = e1, a∗(s ↑ s′) = e2: Let ε2 = (1 −
1)(1 − 2) and ε3 = (1 − 1)2 − (1 − 1)2, one then
obtains that
G(u, s, e2) +G(u, s
′, e1)−G(u, s↓s′, e1)−G(u, s↑s′, e2)
=ε2u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + ε1u((j
′
1 + 1, j
′
2 + 1))
− ε1u((j1 + 1, j′2 + 1))− ε2u((j′1 + 1, j2 + 1))
+ ε3
(
u((j′1 + 1, 0))− u((j1 + 1, 0))
)
≥ε1u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + ε1u((j′1 + 1, j′2 + 1))
− ε1u((j1 + 1, j′2 + 1))− ε1u((j′1 + 1, j2 + 1))
≥0,
where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity
of u and the fact ε1 ≥ ε2, and the second inequality is
due to (22). Equation (23) thus follows.
Case a∗(s ↓ s′) = e2, a∗(s ↑ s′) = e1: One has the
following:
G(u, s, e2) +G(u, s
′, e1)−G(u, s↓s′, e2)−G(u, s↑s′, e1)
=ε2u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + ε1u((j
′
1 + 1, j
′
2 + 1))
− ε2u((j1 + 1, j′2 + 1))− ε1u((j′1 + 1, j2 + 1))
+ (ε1 − ε2 + 2 − 2)
(
u((0, j2 + 1))− u((0, j′2 + 1))
)
≥ε1u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + ε1u((j′1 + 1, j′2 + 1))
− ε1u((j1 + 1, j′2 + 1))− ε1u((j′1 + 1, j2 + 1))
+ (ε1 − ε2)
(
u((0, j2 + 1)) + u((j1 + 1, j
′
2 + 1))
− u((0, j′2 + 1))− u((j1 + 1, j2 + 1))
)
≥0,
which yields (23). The proof thus is complete. 
We are ready to prove Theorem 2. First, let fix j2 and
show that if f∗(s = (j1, j2)) = e1, then f∗(s = (j1 +
j, j2)) = e1 with j ∈ N. Since f∗(s = (j1, j2)) = e1
implies that
(ε1 − ε2)q((j1 + 1, j2 + 1)) + ε3q((j1 + 1, 0))
≥ε4q((0, j2 + 1)) + (12 − 12)q((0, 0))
,Λ3.
where ε4 = 1(1− 2)− 1(1− 2) Since ε1 − ε2 ≥ 0, ε3
and Λ3 is constant for a given j2, by the monotonicity
of q in Lemma 3, one obtains that
(ε1 − ε2)q((j1 + j + 1, j2)) + ε3q((j1 + j + 1, 0)) ≥ Λ3,
which yields f∗(s = (j1 + j, j2)) = e1. Then it concludes
that given a j2, there is a critical curve l1(j2) such that
f∗(s = (j1, j2)) =
{
e1, if j1 ≥ l1(j2),
e2, if j1 < l1(j2).
(24)
Similarly, let fix j1 and show that if f
∗(s = (j1, j2)) = e2,
then f∗(s = (j1, j2 + j)) = e2 with j ∈ N. Note that
f∗(s = (j1, j2)) = e2 implies that
ε4q((0, j2 + 1))− (ε1 − ε2)q((j1 + 1, j2 + 1))
≥ε3q((j1 + 1, 0)) + (12 − 12)q((0, 0))
,Λ4.
Then one has
ε4q((0, j2 + j + 1))− (ε1 − ε2)q((j1 + 1, j2 + j + 1))
=(ε1 − ε2)
(
q((0, j2 + j + 1))− q((j1 + 1, j2 + j + 1))
)
+ (2 − 2)q((0, j2 + j + 1))
≥(ε1 − ε2)
(
q((0, j2 + 1))− q((j1 + 1, j2 + 1))
)
+ (2 − 2)q((0, j2 + 1))
=ε4q((0, j2 + 1))− (ε1 − ε2)q((j1 + 1, j2 + 1))
≥Λ4,
where the first inequality follows from the monotonic-
ity and submodularity of q(s) established in Lemma 3.
Hence f∗(s = (j1, j2 + j)) = e2. Similarly, it concludes
that given a j1, there is a critical curve l2(j1) such that
f∗(s = (j1, j2)) =
{
e2, if j2 ≥ l2(j1),
e1, if j2 < l2(j1).
(25)
To simultaneously satisfy both (24) and (25), both
functions l1(·) and l2(·) must be monotonically non-
decreasing. Then the statements in Theorem 2 follow
immediately by letting lc(j1, j2) = l2(j1)− j2.
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Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 3
The byproduct of Theorem 2 is that for an optimal policy
at no time the action 0 is chosen. This can be extended to
a general case, i.e., the constraint that at each time the
attacker can attack at most N of M systems is equivalent
to the constraint that the attacker attacks exactly N of M
systems. With this in mind, we prove the theorem using
the results in Whittle [1988] on the restless multi-armed
bandit problem.
Recall that d∗i (j, zi) is the optimal rule for the state
τ
(i)
k−1 = j with j ∈ N when the subsidy is zi. We then
have the following definition and lemma.
Definition 2 Whittle [1988] The i-th system is said to
be indexable if for any j ∈ N, d∗i (j, zi) = 0 implies
d∗i (j, z
′
i) = 0 with z
′
i ≥ zi. The whole system is indexable
if each system is indexable.
Lemma 4 The system introduced in Section 2 is index-
able.
Proof 4 We show that each system is indexable. For
ease of notations, throughout this proof, we omit the
subscript i. Denote p(·) as the resulted equilibrium prob-
ability distribution of the state when `(z) = j∗ (func-
tion `(·) is, recall, introduced in (8) 10 ). Then due to
the threshold structure in (8), one obtains that
∞∑
j=0
p(j) =1, (26)
p(j) =
{
(1− )p(j − 1), if 1 ≤ j ≤ j∗,
(1− )p(j − 1), if j > j∗.
(27)
Note that the averaged reward obtained by the attacker
has two parts: the averaged subsidy Rs and the averaged
estimation error Re:
Rs =
j∗−1∑
j=0
p(j)z,
Re =
∞∑
j=0
p(j)Tr(hj(Pˆ )).
Now fix the subsidy z and consider a suboptimal policy.
The policy has a similar threshold structure as in (8)
but with the switching threshold 0 ≤ j < j∗. Denote the
corresponding equilibrium probability distribution as p′,
10 Notice that the subscript i has been omitted.
which is computed in a similar way as (26)(27). Then
one has
j∗−1∑
j=0
p(j) >
j−1∑
j=0
p′(j). (28)
Denote the averaged subsidy and averaged estimation
error as R′s and R
′
e, respectively. Due to the optimality
of l(z) = j∗, one obtains that Rs−R′s ≥ R′e−Re, i.e.,j∗−1∑
j=0
p(j)−
j−1∑
j=0
p′(j)
 z ≥ R′e −Re.
Then by (28), for any z′ ≥ z, it holds thatj∗−1∑
j=0
p(j)−
j−1∑
j=0
p′(j)
 z′ ≥ R′e −Re,
which means that for any subsidy z′ ≥ z, the optimal
rule for the states 0 ≤ j < j∗ is still “not attack”. The
proof thus is complete. 
Asymptotic optimality of the index-based policy pid
stated in Theorem 3 follows immediately from the in-
dexability established in Lemma 4 and [Whittle, 1988,
Conjecture] 11 .
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